Self-selectivity is a new kind of consistency pertaining to social choice rules. It deals with the problem of whether a social choice rule selects itself from among other rival such rules when a society is also to choose the choice rule that it will employ in making its choice from a given set...

We show that in oligopolistic markets the social choice correspondence which selects all socially efficient outcomes is Nash implementable if the number of firms is at least two. Thus, monopoly regulation whenever consumers are favored by the designer or the society is the only framework, among...

We characterize which scoring rules are Maskin-monotonic for each social choice problem as a function of the number of agents and the number of alternatives. We show that a scoring rule is Maskin-monotonic if and only if it satisfies a certain unanimity condition. Since scoring rules are...

We examine the social desirability of learning about the regulated agent in a generalized principal-agent model with incomplete information. An interesting result we obtain is that there are situations in which the agent prefers a Bayesian regulator to have more, yet incomplete, information...

In this study, we regard the oligopolistic-oligopsonistic markets within the framework of a“double auction” in which both buyers and sellers make bids. To this end, we introduce gameswhere declarations of supply and demand functions (which need not be true) are treated asstrategic variables...