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Risk Taking in Winner-Take-All Competition

Kräkel, Matthias; Nieken, Petra; Przemeck, Judith - 2008

We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stage two, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneously invest in a winner-take-all competition. The game is solved theoretically and then tested by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333998

Emotions and the Optimality of Unfair Tournaments

Kräkel, Matthias - 2005

-order tournaments which are frequently used in practice. Tournaments seem to be an appropriate starting point for this concept because … from emotional workers. In this case, he clearly prefers unfair to fair tournaments. Furthermore, the concept of emotions … is used to explain the puzzling findings on the oversupply of effort in experimental tournaments. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334042

Relative Performance Pay, Bonuses, and Job-Promotion Tournaments

Kräkel, Matthias; Schöttner, Anja - 2008

recruitment is observable on nearly any hierarchy level. We explain these empirical puzzles by combining job-promotion tournaments …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334074

Emotions and Incentives

Kräkel, Matthias - 2004

analyzed by focusing on three incentive schemes that are frequently used in practice: tournaments, bonuses and piece rates. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262021

Splitting Leagues

Kräkel, Matthias - 2003

Splitting leagues or tournaments seems to be puzzling when agents are homogeneous and splitting leads to a negative … tournaments (i.e., tournaments that are intertemporally linked), which also enhances incentives. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263059

Emotions and Incentives

Kräkel, Matthias - 2004

analysed by focusing on three incentive schemes that are frequently used in practice: tournaments, bonuses and piece rates. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263111

Preemptive Behavior in Sequential-Move Tournaments with Heterogeneous Agents

Jost, Peter-Jürgen; Kräkel, Matthias - 2004

Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequential. We show that … agents’ strategic behavior in sequential-move tournaments significantly differ from the one in simultaneous-move tournaments …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263117

Risk Taking in Winner-Take-All Competition

Kräkel, Matthias; Nieken, Petra; Przemeck, Judith - 2008

We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stage two, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneously invest in a winner-take-all competition The game is solved theoretically and then tested by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264918

Relative Performance Pay, Bonuses, and Job-Promotion Tournaments

Kräkel, Matthias; Schöttner, Anja - 2008

recruitment is observable on nearly any hierarchy level. We explain these empirical puzzles by combining job-promotion tournaments …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264925

Relative performance pay, bonuses, and job-promotion tournaments

Kräkel, Matthias; Schöttner, Anja - 2008

recruitment is observable on nearly any hierarchy level. We explain these empirical puzzles by combining job-promotion tournaments …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268856