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Power indices are mappings that quantify the influence of the members of a voting body on collective decisions a priori. Their nonlinearity and discontinuity makes it difficult to compute inverse images, i.e., to determine a voting system which induces a power distribution as close as possible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291806
We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328331
environments are then conventionally modeled as weighted voting games. We introduce weighted committee games in order to describe …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011892066
; simple games ; weighted voting games ; square root rule ; Penrose limit theorem ; Penrose-Banzhaf index ; institutional …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569626
We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010225788
the input and the output. The corresponding games are called (j,k) simple games. Here we present a new axiomatization for … the Shapley-Shubik index for (j,k) simple games as well as for a continuous variant, which may be considered as the limit …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842953
value v(L) = 0 that is closed under taking subsets and a set W of winning coalitions W with v(W) = 1. Simple games with α … = minp>0 maxW∈W,L∈L p(L) p(W) < 1 are exactly the weighted voting games. We show that α 6 1 4n for every simple game (N …,v), confi rming the conjecture of Freixas and Kurz (IJGT, 2014). For complete simple games, Freixas and Kurz conjectured that α …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012909150
A weighted game or a threshold function in general admits different weighted representations even if the sum of non-negative weights is fixed to one. Here we study bounds for the diameter of the corresponding weight polytope. It turns out that the diameter can be upper bounded in terms of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012898553
In 1996 D. Felsenthal and M. Machover considered the following model. An assembly consisting of n voters exercises roll-call. All n! possible orders in which the voters may be called are assumed to be equiprobable. The votes of each voter are independent with expectation 0
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936488
Weighted committee games generalize n-player simple voting games to m ≥ 3 alternatives. The committee's aggregation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012941705