A committee is choosing from two alternatives. If required supermajority is not reached, voting is repeated indefinitely, although there is a cost of delay. Under suitable assumptions the equilibrium analysis provides a sharp prediction. The result can be interpreted as a generalization of the...

A committee is choosing from two alternatives. If required supermajority is not reached, voting is repeated indefinitely, although there is a cost of delay. Under suitable assumptions the equilibrium analysis provides a sharp prediction. The result can be interpreted as a generalization of the...

Simple majority does not reflect the intensity of voters’ preferences. This paper presents an efficient collective choice mechanism when the choice is binary and the designer may use non-trasferable punishments to persuade agents to reveal their private information. The designer faces a...

This paper considers a multi-unit ascending auction with two players and common values. A large set of equilibria in this model is not robust to a small reputational perturbation. In particular, if there is a positive probability that there is a type who always demands many units, regardless of...

This paper investigates how mass media provide information to readers or viewers who have diverse interests. The problem of a mass medium comes from the fact that there is a constraint on how much information can be delivered. It is shown that the mass medium optimally provides information that...

This paper investigates how mass medium (sender) provides information to readers or viewers (receivers) who have diverse interests. The problem of the sender comes from the fact that there is a constraint on how much information can be delivered. It is shown that the sender can optimally provide...

This paper considers a model of multi-unit ascending auction with two players and known values. This standard model is not robust to a small reputational perturbation. If reputation is one-sided, then the player without reputation lowers her demand in order to clear the market and stop the...

This paper shows that there are strong reputational effects in a general class of second price auctions, including single-unit English and Vickrey auctions with interdependent values, multiunit ascending and uniform price auctions and a War of Attrition. It is based on recent results on...