-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …

the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …

coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …

-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …

Harsanyi set is related to the Core and Weberset. We also characterize the Harsanyi mapping as the unique mappingsatisfying a …

nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the 'Restricted Core' for such … of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the 'Core', and contains the well … coalitions). For special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this …

coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …

, these results state already that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is given by the core of an associated convex game, a …

, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) propose the downstream incremental solution as the unique welfare distribution that is core … externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of satiation points, it appears that every weighted …

the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …