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Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm׳s stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if the manager is risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, the sensitivity of the manager׳s wealth to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011039247
Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm's stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if the manager is risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, the sensitivity of the manager's wealth to changes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010592147
This study examines the effects of shareholder support for equity compensation plans on subsequent chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. Using cross-sectional regression, instrumental variable, and regression discontinuity research designs, we find little evidence that either lower...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010546970
We use a proprietary data set with detailed executive compensation information to examine the relationship between the incentives of the tax director and GAAP and cash effective tax rates, the book-tax gap, and measures of tax aggressiveness. We find that the incentive compensation of the tax...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572406
Recent research argues that differences in the structure of top executive compensation plans and/or corporate culture explain cross-sectional variation in tax avoidance. However, this research does not link tax planning to the incentives of the specific executive managing the tax function in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584377
The two major paradigms in the theoretical agency literature are moral hazard (i.e., hidden action) and adverse selection (i.e., hidden information). Prior research typically solves these problems in isolation, as opposed to simultaneously incorporating both adverse selection and moral hazard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584386
All companies face challenges designing a governance system that works best for their particular situation and structure. Even the owners of privately held companies sometimes struggle with issues of separation and control. The challenges can be particularly acute when a company founder has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014157454
Proxy advisory firms are independent, for-profit consulting companies that provide voting recommendations to individual and institutional investors. Research shows that these firms have significant influence on voting outcomes. Given this influence, it is important that investors ensure that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014160617
Shareholders of public companies are not responsible for designing executive compensation packages. Still, a shareholder vote on compensation is required in two circumstances: when a company wants to establish an equity-based compensation plan, and annually as part of the Dodd Frank requirement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014163421
The two major paradigmsin the theoretical agency literature aremoral hazard (i.e., hidden action)and adverseselection (i.e., hiddeninformation). Prior research typically solves these problemsin isolation, as opposed to simultaneouslyincorporating both adverseselection and moral hazard features....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116385