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How much to commit to an exchange rate rule : balancing credibility and flexibility

Cukierman, Alex; Kiguel, Miguel A.; Liviatan, Nissan - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000846784

How much to commit to an exchange rate rule? : balancing credibility and flexibility

Cukierman, Alex - In: Revista de análisis económico 7 (1992) 1, pp. 73-89

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001330566

The dynamics of optimal gradual stabilizations

Cukierman, Alex - In: The World Bank economic review 6 (1992) 3, pp. 439-458

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001138257

Optimal accommodation by strong policymakers under incomplete information

Cukierman, Alex - In: Journal of monetary economics 27 (1991) 1, pp. 99-127

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001105736

How much to commit to an exchange rate rule? : balancing credibility and flexibility

Cukierman, Alexander; Kiguel, Miguel A.; Liviatan, Nissan - In: Revista de análisis económico 7 (1992) 1, pp. 73-89

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009943758

The Dynamics of Optimal Gradual Stabilizations.

Cukierman, Alex; Liviatan, Nissan - In: World Bank Economic Review 6 (1992) 3, pp. 439-58

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005548805

Optimal accommodation by strong policymakers under incomplete information

Cukierman, Alex; Liviatan, Nissan - In: Journal of Monetary Economics 27 (1991) 1, pp. 99-127

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005180815

How much to commit to an exchange rate rule : balancing credibility and flexibility

Cukierman, Alex; Kiguel, Miguel A.; Liviatan, Nissan - Economics Research, World Bank Group - 1992

The purpose of this paper is to identify the factors which determine the strength of commitment that policymakers choose to back up a fixed exchange rate system. In practice the commitment level is achieved by choosing a particular set of monetary and exchange rate arrangements. The authors...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005141625