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Multiple equilibria in the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy

Dhillon, Amrita; Lockwood, Ben - In: Journal of public economic theory 4 (2002) 2, pp. 171-184

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001659526

When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?

Dhillon, Amrita; Lockwood, Ben - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001488235

When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?

Dhillon, Amrita; Lockwood, Ben - In: Games and economic behavior 46 (2004) 1, pp. 55-75

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001884083

When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?

Dhillon, Amrita; Lockwood, Ben - In: Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 1, pp. 55-75

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413496

Multiple Equilibria in the Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracy.

Dhillon, Amrita; Lockwood, Ben - In: Journal of Public Economic Theory 4 (2002) 2, pp. 171-84

The Besley-Coate model of representative democracy has the problem of multiple equilibria (Besley-Coate 1997). We show that requiring the Besley-Coate political equilibria to be iteratively undominated at the voting stage refines the set of (pure strategy) political equilibrium outcomes only for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005215854

When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?

Dhillon, Amrita; Lockwood, Ben - In: Games and economic behavior 46 (2004) 1, pp. 55-75

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008215039