We consider two dynamic games of foreign aid. <link rid="ss3">Model 1</link> deals with the case where donor countries continually feel the warm glow from the act of giving. <link rid="ss32">Model 2</link> postulates that donors will stop giving aid when a target level of development is reached. In <link rid="ss3">Model 1</link>, there are multiple equilibria that...

The optimal order of extracting resource deposits of unknown size depends on the informational characteristics of the extraction process. This paper fills the gap between two strands of literature. The first strand is about the optimal extraction of single reserve under stock-size uncertainty....

We present a simple two(-country) by two(-good) differental game model of international trade in which the governments of the two countries play a tariff-setting game. We explicitly derive a unilateral optimum tarifff rate and then a Markov-perfect equilibrium pair of tariff strategies...

In this paper, we complement the work of Kemp and Shimomura (2002) by considering the case of many donors playing a dynamic non-cooperative game of foreign aid. We consider two models. Model 1 deals with the case where donor countries continually feel the warm glow of from the act of giving....

Oil companies often announce revised estimates of their reserves. This indicates that stock uncertainty is a prevalent feature of natural resource industries. In this paper we consider the multi-deposit case where resource extraction produces information about the size of reserves. We show that...