We analyze quality competition between hospitals under vertical health care services differentiation and price regulation. We show that a regulator can set a price to achieve the first-best level of quality for any market structure. However, under free entry, the number of entering hospitals at...

We analyze the regulation of a single health care provider (e.g. a hospital). According to several payment rules used in different countries, we consider a mixed linear payment in which the hospital is paid a fixed price per DRG (diagnosis related group) for most patients (inlier patients) and...

Dans cet article, nous considérons la mise en œuvre du critère de l'offre économiquement la plus avantageuse dans des marchés publics passés par voie électronique. Pour cela, nous analysons la procédure usuelle de l'enchère anglaise inversée avec bonus de qualité en considérant que...

This paper analyses hospitals' regulation when health care demand is quality responsive and when the providers can reduce their costs by an unobservable effort. Socially optimal policy is characterised. We show that the so-called "envelope policy" can imply allocative and productive efficiency...

In this paper, we drop the symmetry assumption in a model of first price procurement auction. We consider the case of two groups of bidders whose costs are drawn from two different uniform distributions. Conditions of existence of a common minimum bid are exhibited and bayesian equilibrium...