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Chapter 4. Reputations in Repeated Games

Mailath, George J.; Samuelson, Larry - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 165-238). 2015

the equilibrium payoff of the long-lived player (demonstrating ex ante reputation effects) and to show that this lower … bound is asymptotically irrelevant under imperfect monitoring (demonstrating the impermanence of reputation effects). The … chapter continues by examining the (necessarily weaker) reputation results that can be established for the case of two long …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025455

Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence

Cripps, Martin W.; Ely, Jeffrey C.; Mailath, George J.; … - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2011

Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. Will the agents commonly learn the value of the parameter, i.e., will the true value of the parameter become approximate common-knowledge? If the signals are independent and identically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009018623

Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown

Mailath, George J.; Nöldeke, Georg - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum, Universität Basel - 2006

Extreme adverse selection arises when private information has unboundedsupport, and market breakdown occurs when no trade is the only equilibriumoutcome. We study extreme adverse selection via the limit behavior of afinancial market as the support of private information converges to an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009025002

Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications

Mailath, George J.; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2010

This note provides several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) result that incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such as Leland and Pyle (1977), Glosten (1989), and De Marzo and Duffie (1999), that were...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008672484

Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications

Mailath, George J.; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

We provide several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) result that in games of asymmetric information with a continuum of types incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability of the informed agent's strategy. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010737648

Incentive compatibility and differentiability: New results and classic applications

Mailath, George J.; von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 5, pp. 1841-1861

We provide several generalizations of Mailathʼs (1987) [9] result that in games of asymmetric information with a continuum of types incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability of the informed agentʼs strategy. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043042

Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340

Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599373

Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown

Mailath, George J.; Nöldeke, Georg - 2006

Extreme adverse selection arises when private information has unbounded support, and market breakdown occurs when no trade is the only equilibrium outcome. We study extreme adverse selection via the limit behavior of a financial market as the support of private information converges to an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390606

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2004

Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762684

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593480