Building upon recent work of Gintis, we study evolutionary dynamics in an economy with Leontieff preferences and corner endowments for which the equilibrium is completely indeterminate. We exhibit a class of dynamics which selects, via stochastic stability, the equilibrium minimizing the...

This paper presents an agent-based model of disaggregated economic systems with endogenous growth features named Lagon GeneriC. This model is thought to represent a proof of concept that dynamically complete and highly disaggregated agent-based models allow to model economies as complex...

We formulate the problem of computing time in discrete dynamical agent-based models in the context of socio-economic modeling. For such formulation, we outline a simple solution. This requires minimal extensions of the original untimed model. The proposed solution relies on the notion of...

Within a standard framework à la Arrow-Debreu, we investigate the dynamics emerging from the interactions of heterogeneous households and firms that are adaptive price setters and financially constrained. We show that depending on the stringency of the financial constraints the model can settle...

We prove the stability of equilibrium in a completely decentralized Walrasian general equilibrium economy in which prices are fully controlled by economic agents, with production and trade occuring out of equilibrium.

We present a mathematical model for the analysis of the bargaining games based on private prices used by Gintis to simulate the dynamics of prices in exchange economies, see [Gintis 2007]. We then characterize, in the Scarf economy, a class of dynamics for which the Walrasian equilibrium is the...

We consider a model of influence with a set of non-strategic agents and two strategic agents. The non-strategic agents have initial opinions and are linked through a simply connected network. They update their opinions as in the DeGroot model. The two strategic agents have fixed opinions, 1 and...

We present a mathematical model for the analysis of the bargaining games based on private prices used by Gintis to simulate the dynamics of prices in exchange economies, see [Gintis 2007]. We then characterize, in the Scarf economy, a class of dynamics for which the Walrasian equilibrium is the...

We prove the stability of equilibrium in a completely decentralized Walrasian general equilibrium economy in which prices are fully controlled by economic agents, with production and trade occuring out of equilibrium.

This paper studies the welfare improvement properties of a market of allowances in an economy with a single type of externality. We show that thanks to the opening of such a market the Pareto optima can be decentralized as marginal pricing equilibria. However, the set of equilibria is much...