Narrow search
Showing 1 - 9 of 9
Cover Image
Tough negotiations: Bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
Ellingsen, Tore; Miettinen, Topi - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 353-366
attrition: Negotiators initially commit to incompatible offers, but agreement occurs once a negotiator's commitment decays. If …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931181
Cover Image
Disagreement and authority
Ellingsen, Tore; Miettinen, Topi - 2007
Can two negotiators fail to agree when both the size of the surplus and the rationality of the negotiators are common knowledge? We show that the answer is affirmative. When the negotiators can make irrevocable commitments at a low but positive cost, the unique symmetric equilibrium entails...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263800
Cover Image
Commitment in Alternating Offers Bargaining
Miettinen, Topi; Perea, Andrés - 2009
, to simultaneously and visibly commit to some share of the pie. If commitment costs are small but increasing in the … approaches zero, the horizon approaches in…nity, and commitment costs approach zero, the unique bargaining outcome corresponds to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012110635
Cover Image
Commitment and conflict in multilateral bargaining
Miettinen, Topi; Vanberg, Christoph - 2020
to a bargaining position prior to negotiating. If successful, commitment binds a player to reject any proposal which … allocates to her a share below a self-imposed threshold. Any such attempted commitment fails and decays with an exogenously … inefficient, according to how how many commitment attempts must fail in order for an agreement to arise. The most inefficient …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012545943
Cover Image
Commitment in Alternating Offers Bargaining
Miettinen, Topi; Perea, Andrés - The Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics and … - 2009
, to simultaneously and visibly commit to some share of the pie. If commitment costs are small but increasing in the … approaches zero, the horizon approaches in…nity, and commitment costs approach zero, the unique bargaining outcome corresponds to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543210
Cover Image
Disagreement and Authority
Ellingsen, Tore; Miettinen, Topi - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
Can two negotiators fail to agree when both the size of the surplus and the rationality of the negotiators are common knowledge? We show that the answer is affrmative. When the negotiators can make irrevocable commitments at a low but positive cost, the unique symmetric equilibrium entails...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090592
Cover Image
Tough negotiations : bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
Ellingsen, Tore; Miettinen, Topi - In: Games and economic behavior 87 (2014), pp. 353-366
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304945
Cover Image
Commitment and conflict in multilateral bargaining
Miettinen, Topi; Vanberg, Christoph - 2020
to a bargaining position prior to negotiating. If successful, commitment binds a player to reject any proposal which … allocates to her a share below a self-imposed threshold. Any such attempted commitment fails and decays with an exogenously … inefficient, according to how how many commitment attempts must fail in order for an agreement to arise. The most inefficient …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012176463
Cover Image
Commitment and conflict in unanimity bargaining
Miettinen, Topi; Vanberg, Christoph - 2024
making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic pre-commitment. Prior to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014578010