Showing 1 - 8 of 8
In this paper it is shown that an extended evolutionary system proposed by Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) may be transformed into a Kukles system. Then a Dulac-Cherkas function related to the Kukles system is derived, which allows us to determine the number of limit cycles or its non-existence.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009328150
In this paper, we reconsider the Foley model of Liquidity / Profit-Rate Cycles where such cycles are generated as bifurcations from initially attracting steady states if a parameter of the model crosses a critical value, for example the growth rate of money supply as in the Foley paper. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107427
In this paper the existence and stability of equilibria in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model display multiple equilibria and it is shown that the Nash Equilibria of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibria in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111249
In this paper the existence and stability of equilibria in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model display multiple equilibria and it is shown that the Nash Equilibria of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibria in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111604
In this paper the existence and stability of equilibria in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model display multiple equilibria and it is shown that the Nash Equilibria of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibria in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010533731
In this paper the existence and stability of equilibria in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model display multiple equilibria and it is shown that the Nash Equilibria of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibria in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010533732
In this paper the existence and stability of equilibriums in an evolutionary game theory model of the labour market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model displays multiple equilibriums and it is shown that the Nash equilibriums of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010780675
In this paper the existence and stability of equilibriums in an evolutionary game theory model of the labour market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model displays multiple equilibriums and it is shown that the Nash equilibriums of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011858403