We consider a two-stage model where a leader, according to its risk-averse proneness, solves a MinSup problem with constraints corresponding to the reaction sets of a follower and defined by the solutions of a quasi-variational inequality (i.e. a variational inequality having constraint sets...

Multicriteria games describe strategic interactions in which players, having more than one criterion to take into account, don't have an a-priori opinion on the rel- ative importance of all these criteria. Roemer (2005) introduces an organizational interpretation of the concept of equilibrium:...

We present optimality conditions for bilevel optimal control problems where the upper level, to be solved by a leader, is a scalar optimal control problem and the lower level, to be solved by several followers, is a multiobjective convex optimal control problem. Multiobjective optimal control...

We introduce a refinement concept for Nash equilibria (slightly altruistic equilibrium) defined by a limit process and which captures the idea of reciprocal altruism as presented in Binmore (2003). Existence is guaranteed for every finite game and for a large class of games with a continuum of...

Given their importance in determining the outcome of many economic interactions, different models have been proposed to determine how social networks form and which structures are stable. In Bala and Goyal (2000), the one-sided link formation model has been considered, which is based on a...

The famous Harsanyi's (1973) Theorem states that generically a finite game has an odd number of Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. In this paper, we show that for finite multicriteria games (games with vector-valued payoffs) this kind of result does not hold. In particular, we show, by...

This paper studies new refinement concepts for correlated equilibria based on altruistic behavior of the players and which generalize some refinement concepts introduced by the authors in previous papers for Nash equilibria. Effectiveness of the concepts, relations with the corresponding notions...

We consider quasi-variational problems (variational problems having constraint sets depending on their own solutions) which appear in concrete economic models such as social and economic networks, financial derivative models, transportation network congestion and traffic equilibrium. First,...

We model climate negotiations as a two-stage game. In the first stage of the game, players have to agree on a global emission cap (GEC). In the second stage, they non-cooperatively choose either their emission level or their emission quota, depending on whether emission trading is allowed, under...

A regularization method for bilevel problems with lower level defined by Nash equilibria is considered and a concept of \viscosity solution" associated to such a regularization is introduced. Sufficient conditions for the existence of viscosity solutions are given and applications to optimistic...