Showing 1 - 10 of 11
We show that too much meritocracy, modeled as accuracy of performance ranking in contests, can be a bad thing: in contests with homogeneous agents, it reduces output and is Pareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement and complacency effects further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932489
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012118067
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013373106
Educational tracking seeks to group students by unobserved ability using measures of observable acquired skills. In a model where individuals have differential skills prior to beginning formal education due to differences in early childhood development (e.g. linguistic, cultural, or nutritional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301702
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014348161
We extend Krugman's (1979) model of trade to multiple sectors or industries and show that, sector-by-sector, a bit of trade is worse than no trade at all. The reason is that the gains from the initiation of trade are second-order, while the welfare loss from the associated drop in varieties is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842638
This short paper extends the analysis of Morgan and Tumlinson (2018) to the setting of a small open economy. We show that in this economy featuring endogenous free entry of firms: (1) Both the number and production of firms is socially optimal. Furthermore production is efficient --- it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012912263
We show that too much meritocracy, modeled as accuracy of performance ranking incontests, can be a bad thing: in contests with homogeneous agents, it reduces output and isPareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement andcomplacency effects further reduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012906885
We show that too much meritocracy, modeled as accuracy of performance ranking in contests, can be a bad thing: in contests with homogeneous agents, it reduces output and is Pareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement and complacency effects further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012851832
Educational tracking seeks to group students by unobserved ability using measures of observable acquired skills. In a model where individuals have differential skills prior to beginning formal education due to differences in early childhood development (e.g. linguistic, cultural, or nutritional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014157951