The Limits of Meritocracy

We show that too much meritocracy, modeled as accuracy of performance ranking in contests, can be a bad thing: in contests with homogeneous agents, it reduces output and is Pareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement and complacency effects further reduce the benefits of meritocracy. Perfect meritocracy may be optimal only for intermediate levels of heterogeneity

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Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Morgan, John
Other Persons:	Tumlinson, Justin (contributor) ; Várdy, Felix (contributor)
Publisher:	[2020]: [S.l.] : SSRN

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (79 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 21, 2019 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3216950 [DOI]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D44 - Auctions
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012851832