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Countering the winner's curse : optimal auction design in a common value model
Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1399-1434
expected value conditional on winning is higher than the unconditional expectation. By contrast, standard auctions that … allocate to the bidder with the highest signal (e.g., the first-price, second-price or English auctions) deliver lower revenue …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415457
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Countering the winner's curse : optimal auction design in a common value model
Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - 2018
than one at a random price. By contrast, standard auctions that allocate to the bidder with the highest signal (e.g., the … first-price, second-price or English auctions) deliver lower revenue because of the adverse selection generated by the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011948704
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Information, Market Power and Price Volatility
Bergemann, Dirk - 2019
We consider demand function competition with a finite number of agents and private information. We show that any degree of market power can arise in the unique equilibrium under an information structure that is arbitrarily close to complete information. In particular, regardless of the number...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012862865
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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, Dirk - 2016
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … informationally robust comparison of alternative bidding mechanisms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013004045
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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, Dirk - 2015
We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … value distributions from winning bid data and for the informationally robust comparison of alternative bidding mechanisms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011350
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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, Dirk - 2015
This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017815
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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, Dirk - 2016
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … and for the informationally robust comparison of alternative bidding mechanisms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992717
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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, Dirk - 2016
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … informationally robust comparison of alternative bidding mechanisms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012982245
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Countering the winner's curse: Optimal auction design in a common value model
Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1399-1434
; whereby the expected value conditional on winning is higher than the unconditional expectation. By contrast, standard auctions … that allocate to the bidder with the highest signal (e.g., the first-price, second-price or English auctions) deliver lower …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189042
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First-price auctions with general information structures : implications for bidding and revenue
Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 85 (2017) 1, pp. 107-143
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011738468