Showing 1 - 10 of 12
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003479787
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001734111
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013136595
Investment decisions require trading off current expenditures against future revenues. If revenues extend far enough into the future, the executives responsible for designing long-run investment policy may no longer be in office by the time all the revenues are realized. We present evidence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012760141
Objective measures of performance are seldom perfect. In response, incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763277
We examine how the level and structure of CEO pay is influenced by the characteristics and past experience of the members of the compensation committee, and also how these characteristics and experiences affect the probability of committee appointment. Our main findings indicate that (1) CEO pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013214654
Objective measures of performance are seldom perfect. In response, incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012474466
Investment decisions require trading off current expenditures against future revenues. If revenues extend far enough into the future, the executives responsible for designing long-run investment policy may no longer be in office by the time all the revenues are realized. We present evidence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012474835
This paper studies career concerns -- concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation -- and describes how optimal incentive contracts are affected when career concerns are taken into account. Career concerns arise frequently: they occur whenever the market uses a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012475208
This chapter summarizes the empirical and theoretical research on executive compensation and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date description of pay practices (and trends in pay practices) for chief executive officers (CEOs). Topics discussed include the level and structure of CEO pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024708