The payoffs of a symmetric 2x2 coordination game are perturbed by agent-specific heterogeneity. Individuals observe a (possibly sampled) history of play, which forms the initial hypothesis for an opponents behaviour. Seeding beliefs in this manner, they iteratively reason toward a Bayesian Nash...

A rational player will never play a strictly dominated strategy. It might be tempting therefore to eliminate such strategies from any subsequent analysis. However, if equilibrium selection is an issue it may be wrong to do so. In models of adaptive learning with state-independence mutations,...

This is an analysis of strategic voting under the qualified majority rule. Existing formal analyses of the plurality rule predict the complete coordination of strategic voting: A strict interpretation of Duvergers Law. This conclusion is rejected. Unlike previous models, the popular support for...

A strategy revision process in symmetric normal form games is proposed. Following Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), members of a population periodically revise their strategy choice, and choose a myopic best response to currently observed play. Their payoffs are perturbed by normally distributed...

Equilibrium selection in coordination games has generated a large literature. Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) studied dynamic models of aggregate behaviour in which agents choose best responses to observations of population play. Crucially, infrequent mistakes (`mutations`)...

This is an analysis of strategic voting under the plurality rule. Existing theories predict strict bipartism, where rational voters support only two candidates: a strict interpretation of Duvergers Law. This conclusion is rejected. The new theory employs a simple model of a three-candidate...

This paper takes a new look at the classic concession game. It argues that exit from an asymmetric war of attrition is likely to be instant. Selecting a unique equilibrium using a craziness perturbation device, it finds a notion of stochastic strength determines the outcome, with a...

Simple plurality election systems (commonly known as `First-Past-The-Post`) are often associated with the dominance of two political parties. Such systems tend to reward leading parties with too many seats (known as the `mechanical` effect) and provoke tactical voting, where voters switch away...