observed to act in isolation from each other. In this paper we use a large-scale dictator game experiment (N = 850) to show …

experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. We find … also show, by conducting an experiment to measure social norms, that it is consistent with social norm compliance. We …

encourage shirking. In contrast, ownpayoff effects suggest that both fines and bonuses discourage shirking. In an experiment we …

experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our … preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms …

is predicted to emerge in their "action commitment" extended game. We then report a laboratory experiment designed to …

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two …

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two …

gift-exchange game laboratory experiment where an employer is matched with two symmetric employees. We compare effort …