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Unbeatable Imitation
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard C - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008615619
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Unbeatable Imitation
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2011
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable in the sense that, even against a very clever opponent,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008620327
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Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2011
We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009393265
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Unbeatable Imitation
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2012
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule ``imitate-if-better'' can hardly be beaten by any strategy. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable in the sense that there is no strategy that can exploit imitation as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010826381
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When is Tit-For-Tat unbeatable?
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2013
We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010826387
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Once beaten, never again: Imitation in two-player potential games
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2011
We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule imitate-if-better cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282072
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Unbeatable imitation
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2012
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule 'imitate-if-better' can hardly be beaten by any strategy. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable in the sense that there is no strategy that can exploit imitation as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282081
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When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2013
We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318837
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Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers
Duersch, Peter; Kolb, Albert; Oechssler, Joerg; … - EconWPA - 2005
number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious … play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those … and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407609
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Through Trial & Error to Collusion
Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo; Oechssler, Joerg - EconWPA - 1998
In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062333