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Dynamic managerial compensation : a variational approach
Garrett, Daniel F.; Pavan, Alessandro - In: Journal of economic theory 159 (2015), pp. 775-818
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549241
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Dynamic managerial compensation : on the optimality of seniority-based schemes
Garrett, Daniel F.; Pavan, Alessandro - 2014
We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically … with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may … power of incentives later in the relationship. Our results follow from a new variational approach that permits us to tackle …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010476876
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Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design
Bergemann, Dirk; Pavan, Alessandro - In: Journal of economic theory 159 (2015), pp. 679-701
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549219
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Sequential contracting with multiple principals
Calzolariy, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro - 2008
This paper considers dynamic games in which multiple principals contract sequentially and non-cooperatively with the same agent. We first show that when contracting is private, i.e. when downstream principals observe neither the mechanisms offered upstream nor the decisions taken in these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665281
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Sequential contracting with multiple principals
Pavan, Alessandro; Calzolari, Giacomo - In: Journal of economic theory 144 (2009) 2, pp. 503-531
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003840889
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Sequential contracting with multiple principals
Calzolari, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003593145
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Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals
Pavan, Alessandro - 2010
This paper considers dynamic games in which multiple principals contract sequentially and non-cooperatively with the same agent. We first show that when contracting is private, i.e. when downstream principals observe neither the mechanisms offered upstream nor the decisions taken in these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012759791
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Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change : Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks
Angeletos, Marios; Hellwig, Christian; Pavan, Alessandro - 2010
Global games of regime change - coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it - have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We extend the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014194481
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Dynamic global games of regime change : learning, multiplicity, and timing of attacks
Angeletos, Marios; Hellwig, Christian; Pavan, Alessandro - 2006
Global games of regime change – coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it – have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We extend...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665284
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Dynamic global games of regime change : learning, multiplicity and the timing of attacks
Angeletos, George-Marios; Hellwig, Christian; Pavan, … - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 75 (2007) 3, pp. 711-756
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003473307