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Dynamic managerial compensation : a variational approach
Garrett, Daniel F.; Pavan, Alessandro - In: Journal of economic theory 159 (2015), pp. 775-818
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549241
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Dynamic managerial compensation : on the optimality of seniority-based schemes
Garrett, Daniel F.; Pavan, Alessandro - 2014
We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically … with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may … power of incentives later in the relationship. Our results follow from a new variational approach that permits us to tackle …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010476876
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Dynamic mechanism design : incentive compatibility, profit maximization and information disclosure
Pavan, Alessandro; Segal, Ilya; Toikka, Juuso - 2009
an AR(k) process. -- asymmetric information ; stochastic processes ; incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665252
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Dynamic Mechanism Design : Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure
Pavan, Alessandro - 2010
We examine the design of incentive-compatible screening mechanisms for dynamic environments in which the agents' types follow a (possibly non-Markov) stochastic process, decisions may be made over time and may affect the type process, and payoffs need not be time-separable. We derive a formula...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142559
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Truthful revelation mechanisms for simultaneous common agency games
Pavan, Alessandro; Calzolari, Giacomo - 2008
This paper considers games in which multiple principals contract simultaneously with the same agent. We introduce a new class of revelation mechanisms that, although it does not always permit a complete equilibrium characterization, it facilitates the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003860805
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On the use of menus in sequential common agency
Calzolariy, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro - 2008
We illustrate, by means of two examples, why assuming the principals offer simple menus (i.e. collections of payoff-relevant alternatives) as opposed to more general mechanisms may preclude a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665282
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Truthful revelation mechanisms for simultaneous common agency games
Pavan, Alessandro; Calzolari, Giacomo - In: American economic journal : a journal of the American … 2 (2010) 2, pp. 132-190
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003996940
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Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games
Pavan, Alessandro - 2010
This paper considers games in which multiple principals contract simultaneously and noncooperatively with the same agent. We introduce a new class of revelation mechanisms which, although they do not always permit a complete equilibrium characterization, do facilitate the characterization of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012759785
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On the Use of Menus in Sequential Common Agency
Calzolari, Giacomo - 2010
We illustrate, by means of two examples, why assuming the principals offer simple menus (i.e. collections of payoff-relevant alternatives) as opposed to more general mechanisms may preclude a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012759794
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Keeping the agents in the dark: private disclosures in competing mechanisms
Attar, Andrea; Campioni, Eloisa; Mariotti, Thomas; … - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012581945