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Dynamic Managerial Compensation : A Mechanism Design Approach
Garrett, Daniel Ferguson - 2010
generate profits for the firm varies stochastically over time. The optimal contract is obtained as the solution to a dynamic …-neutral, the optimal contract can often be implemented with a simple pay package that is linear in the firm's profits. Furthermore …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142525
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Dynamic managerial compensation : on the optimality of seniority-based schemes
Garrett, Daniel F.; Pavan, Alessandro - 2014
We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may either increase or decrease with tenure. However, risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010476876
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Long-Term Contracting in a Changing World
Pavan, Alessandro - 2010
I study the properties of optimal long-term contracts in an environment in which the agent's type evolves stochastically over time. The model stylizes a buyer-seller relationship but the results apply quite naturally to many contractual situations including regulation and optimal income -...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142557
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Long-term contracting in a changing world
Pavan, Alessandro - 2007
I study the properties of optimal long-term contracts in an environment in which the agent's type evolves stochastically over time. The model stylizes a buyer-seller relationship but the results apply quite naturally to many contractual situations including regulation and optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665285
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On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
Calzolari, Giacomo (contributor);  … - 2004
This paper considers an environment where two principals sequentially contract with a common agent and studies the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003779206
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On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
Calzolari, Giacomo (contributor);  … - 2004
This paper considers an environment where two principals sequentially contract with a common agent and studies the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003231416
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On the optimality of rivacy in sequential contracting
Calzolari, Giacomo (contributor);  … - 2005
This paper studies the exchange of information between two principals who contract sequentially with the same agent, as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003780324
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On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting
Calzolari, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro - 2010
This paper studies the exchange of information between two principals who contract sequentially with the same agent, as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071840
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Dynamic managerial compensation : on the optimality of seniority-based schemes
Garrett, Daniel F.; Pavan, Alessandro - 2011
We characterize the firm's optimal contract for a manager who faces costly effort decisions and whose ability to … generate profits for the firm changes stochastically over time. The optimal contract is obtained as the solution to a dynamic … risk-neutral, the optimal contract often entails a simple pay package that is linear in the firm's cash flows. Furthermore …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665264
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Dynamic managerial compensation : a variational approach
Garrett, Daniel F.; Pavan, Alessandro - In: Journal of economic theory 159 (2015), pp. 775-818
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549241