Restrictions placed on bank portfolios are analyzed in a banking model designed to capture the role of checking accounts in facilitating transactions. Forcing banks to hold only liquid assets creates the incentive for liquidity-based runs. Even when a run does not occur, welfare is reduced as a...

We analyze a banking system in which the class of feasible deposit contracts, or mechanisms, is broad. The mechanisms must satisfy a sequential service constraint, but partial or full suspension of convertibility is allowed. Consumers must be willing to deposit, ex ante. We show, by examples,...

An imperfectly competitive economy is very prone to market uncertainty, including uncertainty about the liquidity (or "thickness") of markets. The authors show, in particular, that there exist stochastic equilibrium outcomes in nonstochastic market games if (and only if) the endowments are not...

We analyze a banking system in which the class of feasible deposit contracts, or mechanisms, is broad. The mechanisms must satisfy a sequential service constraint, but partial or full suspension of convertibility is allowed. Consumers must be willing to deposit, ex ante. We show, by examples,...