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Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information

McLean, Richard; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2003

We analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economies. We show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately Walrasian for the associated Arrow-Debreu economy.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109608

Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information

McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074477

Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility with Aggregate Uncertainty

McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - 2003

uncertainty regarding the state of nature, the conflict between incentive compatibility and (ex post) efficiency can be made small … and efficiency for the case in which nontrivial aggregate uncertainty is present, i.e., when significant uncertainty about … compatibility and efficiency asymptotically vanishes when an economy is replicated …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014089832

Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility with Aggregate Uncertainty

McLean, Richard; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150221

Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility

McLean, Richard P. - 2001

generally presents a conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency. We present a notion of informational size … and show that the conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency can be made arbitrarily small if agents are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012742464

Informational Size and Two-Stage Mechanisms

McLean, Richard P. - 2015

We showed in McLean and Postlewaite (2014) that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modifications to VCG mechanisms in interdependent value problems that restore incentive compatibility. This paper presents a two-stage mechanism that similarly restores incentive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013027049

Implementation with interdependent valuations

MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132

Aggregation of Expert Opinions

Gerardi, Dino; McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - 2005

Conflicts of interest arise between a decision maker and agents who have information pertinent to the problem because of differences in their preferences over outcomes. We show how the decision maker can extract the information by distorting the decisions that will be taken, and show that only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014065852

Asymptotic efficiency in large exchange economies with asymmetric information

Gul, Faruk - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 60 (1992) 6, pp. 1273-1292

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001131778

Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices

Mailath, George; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2003

We study transactions that require investments before trading in a competitive market, when forward contracts fixing the transaction price are absent. We show that, despite the market being perfectly competitive and subject to arbitrarily little uncertainty, the inability to jointly determine...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109584

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