Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility

We examine a general equilibrium model with asymetrically informed agents. The presence of asymmetric information generally presents a conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency. We present a notion of informational size and show that the conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency can be made arbitrarily small if agents are sufficiently small informationally

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Year of publication:	[2001]
Authors:	McLean, Richard P.
Other Persons:	Postlewaite, Andrew (contributor)
Publisher:	[2001]: [S.l.] : SSRN

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (38 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 11, 2001 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.267768 [DOI]
Classification:	D51 - Exchange and Production Economies ; D60 - Welfare Economics. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012742464