On the domain of two-sided assignment markets, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies … characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of the bisection property that characterizes the inter- section between the … core and the kernel of a coalitional game in Maschler et al (1979). …

game is associated and the proportional distribution arises as a natural core allocation. We describe a necessary and … sufficient condition for which the core of the game shrinks to the proportional distribution. Furthermore, we characterize … axiomatically the proportional distribution by means of three properties: core-selection, core-invariance and resource monotonicity …

We provide explicit formulas for the nucleolus of an arbitrary assignment game with two buyers and two sellers. Five …

The core of an assignment market is the translation, by the vector of minimum core payoffs, of the core of another … analyzed. The kernel and the nucleolus of the assignment game, are proved to be the translation of the kernel and the nucleolus … of the canonical representative by the vector of minimal core payoffs. …

We provide explicit formulas for the nucleolus of an arbitrary assignment game with two buyers and two sellers. Five …

This article considers single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games that satisfy core selection … arbitrary set of players, core selection and aggregate monotonicity are compatible with individual rationality, the dummy player …

We prove that for any coalitional game the core coincides with the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler when we …