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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530053
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2017
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697162
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018
make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation …. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? An experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011580425
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Social preferences?: Google answers!
Regner, Tobias - 2009
experimental literature we find evidence that tipping is motivated by reciprocity, but also by reputation concerns among frequent … users with an established reputation for non-tipping tend to get low effort answers. In addition, we analyse how tipping is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266676
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? Experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018
make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation …. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985504
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Social Preferences? Google Answers!
Regner, Tobias - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
experimental literature we find evidence that tipping is motivated by reciprocity, but also by reputation concerns among frequent …, while users with an established reputation for non-tipping tend to get low effort answers. In addition, we analyse how …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012075
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Why Voluntary Contributions? Google Answers
Regner, Tobias - Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO), … - 2005
reputation concerns. Moreover, researchers appear to adjust their effort based on the user's previous tipping behaviour. We … reciprocity when people are socially minded, but also generally by strategic behaviour to build up a good reputation. Efficiency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135226
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Can a Bonus Overcome Moral Hazard? An Experiment on Voluntary Payments, Competition, and Reputation in Markets for Expert Services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2017
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932891
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Social preferences? Google Answers!
Regner, Tobias - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 188-209
We analyse pricing, effort and tipping decisions at the online service ‘Google Answers’. Users set a price for the answer to their question ex ante, and they can additionally tip the researcher who provided the answer ex post.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906698