Can a Bonus Overcome Moral Hazard? An Experiment on Voluntary Payments, Competition, and Reputation in Markets for Expert Services
Year of publication: |
2017
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Authors: | Angelova, Vera ; Regner, Tobias |
Publisher: |
München und Berlin : Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition |
Subject: | Asymmetric information | principal-agent | expert services | deception game | sender-receiver game | reciprocity | reputation | experiments | voluntary payment | competition |
Series: | Discussion Paper ; 26 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 895074958 [GVK] hdl:10419/185696 [Handle] RePEc:rco:dpaper:26 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G20 - Financial Institutions and Services. General ; I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets |
Source: |
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera, (2018)
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? Experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera, (2018)
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Angelova, Vera, (2017)
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? Experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera, (2018)
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Angelova, Vera, (2012)
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Angelova, Vera, (2013)
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