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Share price reactions to CEO resignations and large shareholder monitoring in listed French companies
Dherment-Ferere, Isabelle; Renneboog, Luc - In: Corporate governance regimes : convergence and diversity, (pp. 297-321). 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001733860
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Do UK institutional shareholders monitor their investee firms?
Goergen, Marc (contributor); Renneboog, Luc (contributor);  … - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003736680
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Corporate monitoring by blockholders in Europe : empirical evidence of managerial disciplining in Belgium, France, Germany, and the UK
Dherment-Ferere, Isabelle; Köke, F. Jens; Renneboog, Luc - 2001
-executive directors. Board restructuring is correlated to poor performance, but not for France. Neither existing blockholders nor … creditors play an active role in disciplining. Block purchases have a monitoring role in Belgium and Germany, but not in France …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011446114
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Identifying ultimate beneficial owners : a risk-based approach to improving the transparency of international financial flows
Crama, Yves; Hübner, Georges; LeRuth, Luc; Renneboog, Luc - 2021 - Revised version
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012631107
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Corporate monitoring by blockholders
Dherment-Férère, Isabelle; Renneboog, Luc - In: Corporate governance : a synthesis of theory, research, …, (pp. 347-370). 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008702050
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Share price reactions to CEO resignations and large shareholder monitoring in listed French companies
Dherment-Ferere, Isabelle; Renneboog, Luc - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001505536
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Corporate monitoring by blockholders in Europe : empirical evidence of managerial disciplining in Belgium, France, Germany, and the UK
Dherment-Ferere, Isabelle - 2001
-executive directors. Board restructuring is correlated to poor performance, but not for France. Neither existing blockholders nor … creditors play an active role in disciplining. Block purchases have a monitoring role in Belgium and Germany, but not in France …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013428410
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Corporate monitoring by blockholders in Europe: empirical evidence of managerial disciplining in Belgium, France, Germany, and the UK
Dherment-Ferere, Isabelle; Köke, Jens; Renneboog, Luc - 2001
-executive directors. Board restructuring is correlated to poor performance, but not for France. Neither existing blockholders nor … creditors play an active role in disciplining. Block purchases have a monitoring role in Belgium and Germany, but not in France …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010297760
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Shareholding concentration and pyramidal ownership structures in Belgium
Renneboog, Luc - In: Corporate governance, financial markets and global …, (pp. 262-299). 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009130817
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CEO social power, board inclusiveness, and corporate performance after ethnic conflicts
Nazlıben, Kamil Korhan; Renneboog, Luc; Uduwalage, Emil - In: Emerging markets review 56 (2023), pp. 1-25
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014478663