Why do diverse groups outperform homogeneous groups in some settings, but not in others? We show that while diverse groups experience more frictions than homogeneous ones, they are also less conformist. Homogeneous groups minimize the risk of miscoordination, but they may get stuck in an...

Why do diverse groups outperform homogeneous groups in some settings, but not in others? We show that while diverse groups experience more frictions than homogeneous ones, they are also less conformist. Homogeneous groups minimize the risk of miscoordination, but they may get stuck in an...

We consider a dynamic matching problem where players are repeatedly assignedtasks and can choose whether to accept or reject them. Players prefer to avoidcertain tasks (“hot potatoes”) while other tasks give a positive payoff (“sweet pota-toes”). There are frictions in the matching...

The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect from playing the game. Wecharacterize how the value of a coordination game depends on the economic environment.The central insight is that players face two types of coordination problems: (1) How tocoordinate on a Nash equilibrium (i.e.,...

We introduce a model of homophily that does not rely on the assumption of homophilous preferences. Rather, it builds on the dual process account of Theory of Mind in psychology which focuses on the role of introspection in decision making. Homophily emerges because players find it easier to put...

This paper presents a novel mechanism under which diversity affects performance even if it has no direct impact on payoffs. Diversity matters because it influences the degree of strategic uncertainty that players face. We model this by incorporating the dual process account of Theory of Mind...