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~person:"Schipper, Burkhard C."
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1
Unbeatable Imitation
Duersch, Peter
;
Oechssler, Jörg
;
Schipper, Burkhard C.
-
2010
effort coordination games, arms race, search,
bargaining
, etc., imitation cannot be beaten by much even by a very clever …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422207
Saved in:
2
Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games
Duersch, Peter
;
Oechssler, Jörg
;
Schipper, Burkhard C.
-
2010
It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422214
Saved in:
3
The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance
Schipper, Burkhard C.
-
2005
We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans maintain optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents' actions and maximize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333763
Saved in:
4
Strategic teaching and learning in games
Schipper, Burkhard C.
-
2015
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011545296
Saved in:
5
Strategic Teaching and Learning in Games
Schipper, Burkhard C.
-
2017
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011936488
Saved in:
6
The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance
Schipper, Burkhard C.
-
2005
We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans maintain optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents' actions and maximize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276584
Saved in:
7
On an evolutionary foundation of neuroeconomics
Schipper, Burkhard C.
-
2008
Neuroeconomics focuses on brain imaging studies mapping neural responses to choice behavior. Economic theory is concerned with choice behavior but it is silent on neural activities. We present a game theoretic model in which players are endowed with an additional structure - a simple ``nervous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276635
Saved in:
8
Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games
Duersch, Peter
;
Oechssler, Jörg
;
Schipper, Burkhard C.
-
2012
We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422230
Saved in:
9
When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
Duersch, Peter
;
Oechssler, Joerg
;
Schipper, Burkhard C.
-
2013
We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318837
Saved in:
10
Once beaten, never again: Imitation in two-player potential games
Duersch, Peter
;
Oechssler, Joerg
;
Schipper, Burkhard C.
-
2011
We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule imitate-if-better cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282072
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