This paper highlights the strategic role that private quality standards play in food supply chains. Considering two symmetric retailers that are exclusively supplied by a finite number of producers and endogenizing the producers' delivery choice, we show that there exist two asymmetric...

Consumer goods undergo a series of transformations and transactions before they reach the consumer. Their quality is, therefore, determined by the qualities obtained at each single step of the value chain. Consequently, quality assurance along the whole value chain is of utmost importance for...

Konsumgüter durchlaufen verschiedene Transformations- und Transaktionsstufen, bevor sie den Verbraucher erreichen. Die Qualität der Güter bestimmt sich demzufolge aus den Qualitäten, die auf den einzelnen Stufen der Wertschöpfungskette erzielt werden. Die Qualitätssicherung entlang der...

This paper highlights the strategic role that private quality standards play in food supply chains. Considering two symmetric retailers that are exclusively supplied by a finite number of producers and endogenizing the producers' delivery choice, we show that there exist two asymmetric...

We explore the strategic role of private quality standards in food supply chains. Considering two symmetric retailers that are exclusively supplied by a finite number of producers and endogenizing the suppliers' delivery choice, we show that there exist two asymmetric equilibria in the...

This paper highlights the strategic role that private quality standards play in food supply chains. Considering two symmetric retailers that are exclusively supplied by a finite number of producers and endogenizing the producers' delivery choice, we show that there exist two asymmetric...

A manufacturer contracting secretly with several downstream competitors faces an opportunism problem, preventing it from exerting its market power. In an infinitely repeated game, the opportunism problem can be relaxed. We show that the upstream firm's market power can be restored even further...

Considering a vertical structure with perfectly competitive upstream firms that deliver a homogenous good to a differentiated retail duopoly, we show that upstream fixed costs may help to monopolize the downstream market. We find that downstream prices increase in upstream firms' fixed costs...

We analyze below-cost pricing in retail markets and examine its impact on social welfare as well as on suppliers' incentives to invest in quality. Considering negotiations about a linear wholesale price between the retailer and her suppliers, we find that below-cost pricing aggravates the double...

We analyze the listing decisions of a retailer who may ask her suppliers to make upfront payments in order to be listed. We consider a sequential game with upfront payments being negotiated before short-term delivery contracts. We show that the retailer is more likely to use upfront payments the...