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Adding a stick to the carrot? : the interaction of bonuses and fines
Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2007
actually pay the announced bonus. This offers a new explanation for why explicit and implicit incentives are substitutes rather …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365854
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Contracts, fairness, and incentives
Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2004
actors provide powerful incentives and become superior when there are some fair-minded players. The principals understand … enforcement power of explicit and implicit incentives. This contract preference is associated with the fact that explicit … incentives weaken the enforcement power of implicit bonus incentives significantly. Our results are largely consistent with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261212
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The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories
Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
Chapter written for the Handbook of Reciprocity, Gift-Giving and Altruism
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785902
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Fairness and Contract Design
Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players. But …, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness and incentives. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785926
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Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model
Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585634
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Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model
Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2004
This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005157507
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Fairness and Contract Design
Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2005
provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players. But …, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness and incentives. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333864
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Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines
Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2007
actually pay the announced bonus. This offers a new explanation for why explicit and implicit incentives are substitutes rather …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333948
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The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism -€“ Experimental Evidence and New Theories
Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2005
Chapter written for the Handbook of Reciprocity, Gift-Giving and Altruism
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334040
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Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity. Evidence and Economic Applications
Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2001
Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427343