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Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge

Ewerhart, Christian - In: Homo oeconomicus 13 (1996) 4, pp. 501-514

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001214887

Der Lock-in-Effekt und das Hold-up-Problem

Ewerhart, Christian - In: Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium : WiSt ; … 26 (1997) 7, pp. 361-363

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001222153

"Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts

Ewerhart, Christian; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 43 (2000) 1, pp. 115-125

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001512262

Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework

Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003773922

Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework

Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics letters 101 (2008) 3, pp. 268-271

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003801405

Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments

Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003931045

Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? : experimental evidence

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Games and economic behavior 73 (2011) 1, pp. 186-199

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009273256

Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments

Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Journal of mathematical economics 46 (2010) 5, pp. 807-816

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009300195

Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities : an experimental study

Nieken, Petra; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 26 (2023) 5, pp. 989-1021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014500450

Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract : Experimental Evidence

Hoppe, Eva I. - 2009

A central insight of agency theory is that when a principal offers a contract to a privately informed agent, the principal trades off ex post efficiency in the bad state of nature against a larger profit in the good state of nature. We report about an experiment with 508 participants designed to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012718247