The study addresses the issue of sustainability of collusion in one-sided auctions. Earlier experimental studies indicate that, in double oral auctions, collusion is hard to sustain even if conspiracy is allowed and quotation improvement rules are absent. We investigate the role of similar...

The paper reports the results of an experimental study of the three firm location problem. We compare the subjects' behavior in the experiments with the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium calculated by Shaked (1982). Overall, the findings are consistent with the equilibrium prediction....

We investigate bidder collusion in one-sided ascending price auctions without communication. If bidding rules in an English-type auction allow bidders to match each others' bids, collusion can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium of a one-shot auction game. Our earlier experiments show that in...

In an ongoing organization, such as a large law parternship firm, employees are motivated not only by current rewards but also by the prospect of promotion, and the opportunity to influence policy and make the rules in the future. This leads to a dynamic programming problem in contract design....

The paper considers an extension of the original Shapley and Shubik (1972) two-sided matching problem to the case of multisided matching with transfereable utility. We investigate existence and properties of stable matchings using the approach of cooperative game theory.

The paper investigates the sources and efficiency of the existing ranking of professional partnerships or research groups into upper and lower tiers.

We study how people's predisposition towards altruism, as measured by tools developed by psychologists, affects their behaviour in a voluntary contributions public good environment. Earlier experiments provide evidence against the strong free rider hypothesis; however, contributions to the...