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On the number of blocks required to access the core

Béal, Sylvain; Rémila, Eric; Solal, Philippe - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

For any transferable utility game in coalitional form with nonempty core, we show that that the number of blocks … required to switch from an imputation out of the core to an imputation in the core is less than or equal to n(n-1)/2, where n …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008694029

An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games

Béal, Sylvain; Rémila, Eric; Solal, Philippe - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

For any transferable utility game in coalitional form with a nonempty core, we show that that the number of blocks … required to switch from an imputation out of the core to an imputation in the core is at most n-1, where n is the number of … players. This bound exploits the geometry of the core and is optimal. It considerably improves the upper bounds found so far …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108416

Weighted Component Fairness for Forest Games

Béal, Sylvain; Rémila, Eric; Solal, Philippe - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

We present the axiom of weighted component fairness for the class of forest games, a generalization of component fairness introduced by Herings, Talman and van der Laan (2008) in order to characterize the average tree solution. Given a system of weights, component eciency and weighted component...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528744

Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form};

Béal, Sylvain; Rémila, Eric; Solal, Philippe - Centre de Recherche sur les Stratégies Économiques … - 2015

This article studies values for cooperative games with transferable utility. Numerous such values can be characterized by axioms of associated consistency, which require that a value is invariant under some parametrized linear transformation on the vector space of cooperative games with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011227973

A Class of Solidarity Allocation Rules for TU-games

Béal, Sylvain; Rémila, Eric; Solal, Philippe - Centre de Recherche sur les Stratégies Économiques … - 2015

A new class of allocation rules combining marginalistic and egalitarian principles is introduced for cooperative TU-games. It includes some modes of solidarity among the players by taking the collective contribution of some coalitions to the grand coalition into account. Relationships with other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011196785

Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games

Béal, Sylvain; Rémila, Eric; Solal, Philippe - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

We consider an alternative expression of the Shapley value that reveals a system of compensations: each player receives an equal share of the worth of each coalition he belongs to, and has to compensate an equal share of the worth of any coalition he does not belong to. We give an interpretation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008619182

On the number of blocks required to access the coalition structure core

Béal, Sylvain; Rémila, Eric; Solal, Philippe - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

This article shows that, for any transferable utility game in coalitional form with nonempty coalition structure core …, the number of steps required to switch from a payoff configuration out of the coalition structure core to a payoff … configuration in the coalition structure core is less than or equal to (n*n+4n)/4, where n is the cardinality of the player set …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008923017

Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization

Béal, Sylvain; Chakrabarti, Subhadip; Ghintran, Amandine; … - In: Games 1 (2010) 3, pp. 338-356

We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682968

Règles d'allocation pour les programmes de pass culturel. Allocation rules for museum pass programs

Béal, Sylvain; Solal, Philippe - In: Revue économique 61 (2010) 6, pp. 1099-1109

We consider the problem of allocating the income of museum pass programs. Various properties of an allocation rule for such problems are introduced. Two allocation rules are characterized and are shown to coincide with the Shapley value and the equal division solution of the associated tu-game...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008756104

The Sequential Equal Surplus Division for Sharing International Rivers with Bifurcations

Béal, Sylvain; Ghintran, Amandine; Rémila, Eric; … - Centre de Recherche sur les Stratégies Économiques … - 2012

We consider the problem of sharing water from a river among the group of countries located along it. The benefit of each country depends on the amount of water it consumes. An allocation of the water is efficient when it maximizes the total benefits of the countries. The problem of finding a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010856006