The article examine how the existence of a retailer owned brand, private label, affects the price setting of a national brand. We find that the potential for a private label introdution may lead to price consessions form the national brand producer, but that actual private label introduction as...

We present a model of the TV-advertising market that encompasses both the product markets and the market for TV programs. We argue that the TV industry has several idiosyncratic characteristics that need to be modeled, and show that the strategic interaction in this industry differs from other...

New regulation for the EU automobile industry allows dealers to engage in multifranchise operation, a practice that formerly could be prohibited by the producers in this market. We argue that a likely consequence of thsi shift in regulatory regime is increased dealer concentration. This will...

Should a public firm locate close to or far away from a private firm, i.e., is duplication or diversity the optimum policy? We extend the classical Hotelling location game with exogenously fixed prices to the case where consumers' transportation costs are asymmetric, in the sense that it is more...

A market is served by domestic and foreign firms, where the latter incurs a trade cost when delivering to the market. We ask now how trade liberalization -interpreted as a reduction in trade costs- affects the profitability and the welfare effects of a merger between two domestic firms.

The purpose of this paper is to test the nature of competition concerning price and capacity setting in the Norwegian airline industry after the deregulation in 1994. Did the two airlines, SAS and Braathens, compete on prices and capacities (competition), collude on prices and capacities...

The capacity investment by a new firm into an established market is explored in a repeated price game. If the entrant expects collusion to prevail upon entry, it may not practice "judo economics" but instead choose to install enough capacity to serve the entire market. This occurs when collusion...

We analyze two-part tariffs in oligopoly, where each firm commits to a certain quantity. The model is an extension of the one introduced in Harrison and Kline (2001).We show that their main results are reversed when the model is extended from one to two types of consumers.