We estimate dynamic models of elder-care arrangements using data from the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old Survey. We model the use of institutional care, formal home health care, care provided by a child, and care provided by a spouse in the selection of each care arrangement,...

We estimate dynamic models of elder-care arrangements using data from the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old Survey. We model the use of institutional care, formal home health care, care provided by a child, and care provided by a spouse in the selection of each care arrangement,...

This paper describes and analyzes research on the dynamics of long-term care and suggests directions for the literature to make progress. We discuss sources and causes of dynamics including inertia/state dependence (confounded by unobserved heterogeneity); match-specific effects; and costs of...

We estimate dynamic models of elder-care arrangements using data from the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old Survey. We model the use of institutional care, formal home health care, care provided by a child, and care provided by a spouse in the selection of each care arrangement,...

This paper describes and analyzes research on the dynamics of long-term care and suggests directions for the literature to make progress. We discuss sources and causes of dynamics including inertia/state dependence (confounded by unobserved heterogeneity); match-speciÂ…c effects; and costs of...

We estimate dynamic models of elder-care arrangements using data from the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old Survey. We model the use of institutional care, formal home health care, care provided by a child, and care provided by a spouse in the selection of each care arrangement,...

This paper describes and analyzes research on the dynamics of long-term care and suggests directions for the literature to make progress. We discuss sources and causes of dynamics including inertia/state dependence (confounded by unobserved heterogeneity); match-specific effects; and costs of...

We use the 1993 wave of the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) data set to estimate a game-theoretic model of families' decisions concerning the provision of informal and formal care for elderly individuals. The outcome is the Nash equilibrium where each family member...