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Strive to be first or avoid being last : an experiment on relative performance incentives

Dutcher, E. Glenn; Balafoutas, Loukas; Lindner, Florian; … - 2013

behavior in all mechanisms is consistent with basic directional and reinforcement learning. -- tournament ; reward ; punishment … ; promotion ; firing ; contract ; experiment ; learning …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009743404

Strive to be first or avoid being last : an experiment on relative performance incentives

Dutcher, E. Glenn; Balafoutas, Loukas; Lindner, Florian; … - 2015

We utilize a laboratory experiment to compare effort provision under optimal tournament contracts with different distributions of prizes which motivate agents to compete to be first, avoid being last, or both. We find that the combined tournament contract incorporating both incentives at the top...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337036

Strive to be first and avoid being last : an experiment on relative performance incentives ; conference paper

Dutcher, E. Glenn; Balafoutas, Loukas; Lindner, Florian; … - 2013

reinforcement learning. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340563

Strive to be first or avoid being last : an experiment on relative performance incentives

Dutcher, E. Glenn; Balafoutas, Loukas; Lindner, Florian; … - In: Games and economic behavior 94 (2015), pp. 39-56

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574878

Efficiency gains from team-based coordination : large-scale experimental evidence

Feri, Francesco (contributor); Irlenbusch, Bernd (contributor) - 2008

differences between individuals and teams using the experience weighted attraction learning model. -- Coordination games … ; individual decision-making ; team decision-making ; experience-weighted attraction learning ; experiment …