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Non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) use the assumption that coalition of signatories maximize their joint welfare. The joint maxi- mization assumption is compared with di®erent sharing pro¯t schemes such as Shapley value, Nash bargaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463821
studies for different forms of cooperation what effects international adaptation transfers will have on (i) domestic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642138
We investigate the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) by applying game theory. The paper extends further our previous research on farsightedly stable coalitions and preferred farsightedly stable coalitions (Osmani & Tol 2007). The integrated assessment model FUND provides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634580
Game theory is used to analyze the formation and stability of coalitions for environmental protection. The paper extends further our previous research on farsightedly stable coalitions and preferred farsightedly stable coalitions (Osmani & Tol 2007a). The integrated assessment model FUND...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634620
The stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is analyzed by using game theory. The integrated assessment model FUND provides the cost-bene¯t payo® functions of pollution abatement for sixteen di®erent world regions. The farsighted stability concept of Chwe (1994) is used and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593133
Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agree- ments (IEAs) that employ the cartel stability concept of d'Aspremont et al. (1983) frequently use the assumption that countries can sign a single agreement only. We modify the assump- tion by considering...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634599
The Ramsey rule for the consumption rate of discount assumes a transfer of money of a (representative) agent at one point in time to the same agent at another point in time. Climate policy (implicitly) transfers money not just over time but also between agents. I propose three alternative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257150
Ocean acidification is increasingly recognized as a major global problem. Yet economic assessments of its effects are currently almost absent. Unlike most other marine organisms, mollusks, which have significant commercial value worldwide, have relatively solid scientific evidence of biological...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009149139
Estimates of the impacts of observed climate change during the 20th century obtained by different integrated assessment models (IAMs) are separated into their main natural and anthropogenic components. The estimates of the costs that can be attributed to natural variability factors and to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010686008
A Bentham–Rawls welfare function is the weighted sum of the net present welfare (Bentham) and the welfare of the worst-off generation (Rawls). If utility is non-decreasing over time, optimal climate policy is more stringent in the near-term under the Bentham criterion than under the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010688083