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Lies and Biased Evaluation : A Real-Effort Experiment

Rosaz, Julie; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2011

This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors report the workers’ performance to the experimenter. The report is non verifiable and determines the earnings of both the supervisor and the worker. We find that not all the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318147

Lies and biased evaluation : a real-effort experiment

Rosaz, Julie; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2011

This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors report the workers' performance to the experimenter. The report is non verifiable and determines the earnings of both the supervisor and the worker. We find that not all the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009311502

Respect as an Incentive

Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2010

extrinsic incentives by the availability of non-monetary incentives. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008676576

Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay : An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting

Villeval, Marie-Claire; Eriksson, Tor - 2004

experiment that analyzes the influence of other-regarding preferences on sorting and incentives. Experimental evidence shows that … the provision of incentives and their sorting effect. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261940

Self-selection and the efficiency of tournaments

Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2006

When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance (Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987). However, since the efficiency of performance-related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267611

Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger : An Experiment with Managers and Students

Montmarquette, Claude; Rullière, Jean-Louis; Villeval, … - 2004

with managers from companies with different incentives, work habits and recruiting methods. In this paper, we investigate …, which occur in both compensation incentives and team composition. The results of a real effort experiment conducted with … managers within a large pharmaceutical company not only show that changes in compensation incentives affect performance but …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276427

Respect as an incentive

Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2010

extrinsic incentives by the availability of non-monetary incentives. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277038

Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments

Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763542

Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay – An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting

Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004

experiment that analyzes the influence of other-regarding preferences on sorting and incentives. Experimental evidence shows that … the provision of incentives and their sorting effect. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763609

Performance Pay, Sorting and Social Motivation

Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Nationalökonomisk Institut, Institut for Økonomi - 2008

. Our experiment investigates the impact of performance pay on both incentives and sorting and analyzes the influence of … performance pay. Social motivation and reputation influence both the provision of incentives and their sorting effect. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005424118