Similar Search Results

The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations

Königstein, Manfred; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005

The labor economics literature has shown that the "efficient bargaining" model, in which wage and employment are negotiated simultaneously, is less frequently used on unionized markets than the less efficient "right-to-manage" model, in which wage is determined via bargaining and employment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822647

Lies and Biased Evaluation : A Real-Effort Experiment

Rosaz, Julie; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2011

This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors report the workers’ performance to the experimenter. The report is non verifiable and determines the earnings of both the supervisor and the worker. We find that not all the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318147

Tax Evasion, Welfare Fraud, and the « Broken Windows » Effect : An Experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands

Lefebvre, Mathieu; Pestieau, Pierre; Riedl, Arno; … - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2011

In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318150

Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment

Rosaz, Julie; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2012

This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors report the workers' performance to the experimenter. The report is non veriﬁable and determines the earnings of both the supervisor and the worker. We ﬁnd that not all the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009278326

Effort and comparison income: experimental and survey evidence

Clark, Andrew E.; Masclet, David; Villeval, Marie-Claire - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2008

This paper considers the effect of status or relative income on work effort, combining experimental evidence from a gift-exchange game with the analysis of multi-country ISSP survey data. We find a consistent negative effect of others’ incomes on individual effort in both datasets. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746495

Surenchères salariales et conflictualité : une approche expérimentale

Tournadre, Fabienne; Villeval, Marie-Claire - In: Revue d'économie politique 112 (2002) 1, pp. 157-171

Based on a non cooperative model with asymmetric information tested by means of a laboratory experiment, this paper examines the influence of a negotiation outcome on the demand behavior in subsequent negotiations. While the assumption of inflationary wage claims is rejected by the data, a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011187186

The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations

Königstein, Manfred; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008789506

Cooperation, Competition, and Risk Attitudes: An Intergenerational Field and Laboratory Experiment

Charness, Gary; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2007

behavior of juniors (under 30) and seniors (over 50) in both experiments conducted onsite with the employees of two large firms … external validity of conventional laboratory experiments. In general we do not find strong differences in behavior between … workers and non-workers, indicating that laboratory experiments may not be such a bad approximation for the field environment. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008793278

The choice of the agenda in labor negotiations: efficiency and behavioral considerations

Königstein, Manfred; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2005

The labor economics literature has shown that the efficient bargaining model, in which wage and employment are negotiated simultaneously, is less frequently used on unionized markets than the less efficient right-to-manage model, in which wage is determined via bargaining and employment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267680

Tax evasion: cheating rationally or deciding emotionally?

Coricelli, Giorgio; Joffily, Mateus; Montmarquette, Claude - 2007

The economic models of tax compliance predict that individuals should evade taxes when the expected benefit of cheating is greater than its expected cost. When this condition is fulfilled, the high compliance however observed remains a puzzle. In this paper, we investigate the role of emotions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268232