nations, as in a strategic game of international conflict handing over military spending decisions to citizens who face a …

potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation, and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids … a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict. We … show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information …

We consider preference evolution in a class of conflict models with finite populations. We show that whereas aggregate … conflict effort is always the same in evolutionary equilibrium, larger populations have greater individual subjective costs of … conflict effort. …

nations, as in a strategic game of international conflict handing over military spending decisions to citizens who face a …

potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation, and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids … a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict. We … show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information …

single-tier organizations, even though they offer more scope for organizational conflict and have more executives that can be … influenced. These benefits derive from two effects. First, part of the conflict in multi-divisional organizations takes place on …

agents who are uncertain about each other's fighting potential. We model the default option of outright conflict as a … probabilistic contest. Examples of such contests may be international conflict, litigation, and elections. We show, in particular …, that if the loss of surplus from outright conflict is small enough, then any mechanism must assign a positive probability …

distributional conflict, even if all it does is add another level of conflict. In case managers have to be provided with incentives …