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We analyze the design of bailout regimes when investment is distorted by a toomany-to-fail problem. The first-best allocation equalizes benefits from more banks investing in high-return projects with endogenously higher systemic risk due to more banks failing simultaneously. A standard bailout...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014284579
We analyze the design of bailout regimes when investment is distorted by a too-many-to-fail problem. The first-best allocation equalizes benefits from more banks investing in high-return projects with endogenously higher systemic risk due to more banks failing simultaneously. A standard bailout...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014350691
We analyze the design of bailout regimes when investment is distorted by a toomany-to-fail problem. The first-best allocation equalizes benefits from more banks investing in high-return projects with endogenously higher systemic risk due to more banks failing simultaneously. A standard bailout...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014374617
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015404332