investment. For the first case, we find that even absent asymmetric information, a lack of regulatory commitment can cause …

investment. For the first case, we find that even absent asymmetric information, a lack of regulatory commitment can cause …

investment. For the first case, we find that even absent asymmetric information, a lack of regulatory commitment can cause …

-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …

-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …

Most insurance companies publish few data on the occurrence and detection of insurance fraud. This stands in contrast … to the previous literature on costly state verification, which has shown that it is optimal to commit to an auditing … strategy, as the credible announcement of thoroughly auditing claim reports might act as a powerful deterrent. We show that …

committing to a fraud-detection strategy eliminates the ambiguity about auditing. Thus, strategic ambiguity can be an equilibrium …Most insurance companies publish few data on the occurrence and detection of insurance fraud. This stands in contrast … to the previous literature on costly state verification, which has shown that it is optimal to commit to an auditing …

Most insurance companies publish few data on the occurrence and detection of insurance fraud. This stands in contrast … to the previous literature on costly state verification, which has shown that it is optimal to commit to an auditing … strategy, as the credible announcement of thoroughly auditing claim reports might act as a powerful deterrent. We show that …