We consider the two-stage game proposed by Kreps and Scheinkman (83) in the address-model of horizontal differentiation developed by Hotelling. Firms choose capacities in the first stage and then compete in prices. We show that price competition is drastically softened since in almost all...

We consider the effects of export restraints on price competition in the Hotelling model of horizontal differentiation. We characterize the Nash equilibrium for all possible values of the quota and compare our results with those of Krishna (89). We show that a foreign producer would choose a VER...

We study duopoly competition between a domestic and a foreign firm who first choose their quality and then compete in prices in the domestic market. As is well known, the free-trade equilibrium exhibits quality differentiation and indeterminacy of the quality leader. We show that an import quota...

A regulator imposing "sales restrictions" on firms competing in oligopolistic markets may enhance quality provision by the firms. Moreover, for most restrictions levels, the impact on quality selection is invariant to the mode of competition.

In this note, we consider a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly model in which products are differentiated â€à la Hotellingâ€. We assumine that only one of the two firms faces a capacity constraint. For this particular case, we characterize the equilibrium payoff of the unconstrained firm for the...

We show in a simple model of entry with sunk cost, that a regulator prefers limiting the output, orcapacity, of the incumbent firm rather than imposing a “Minimum Quality Standard” in order tohelp the entrant to provide high quality. As a by-product, our analysis makes a contribution to...

In this note, we consider a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly model in which products are differentiated ”à la Hotelling”. We assumine that only one of the two firms faces a capacity constraint. For this particular case, we characterize the equilibrium payoff of the unconstrained firm for the...