No abstract.

No abstract.

No abstract.

We consider a market for lemons in which the seller is a monopolistic price setter and the buyer receives a private noisy signal of the product’s quality. We model this as a game and analyze perfect Bayesian equilibrium prices, trading probabilities and gains of trade. In particular, we vary...

Accordingto Hamilton’s(1964a, b) rule,a cost lyaction will be undertaken if its fitness cost to the actor falls short of the discounted benefit to the recipient,where the discount factor is Wright’s index of relatedness between the two. We propose a generalization of this rule,and show that...

No abstract.

This paper examines equilibrium and stability in symmetric two-player cheap-talk games. In particular, we characterize the set of neutrally stable outcomes in finite cheap-talk 2 x 2 coordination games. This set is finite and functionally independent of risk-dominance relations. As the number of...