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License auctions with exit (and entry) options : alternative remedies for the exposure problem
Hu, Luke; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2012
Inspired by some spectrum auctions, we consider a stylized license auction with incumbents and one entrant. Whereas the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009685869
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Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type
Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2013
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781360
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Optimal bid disclosure in license auctions with downstream interaction
Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2014
The literature on license auctions for process innovations in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning …, partial, and no disclosure of bids, which correspond to standard auctions. We show that more information disclosure increases …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010378352
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The third generation (UMTS) spectrum auction in Germany
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 2001
competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956370
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Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas
Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Wolfstetter, Elmar - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 1999
game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient …, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956380
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Implementing efficient market structure
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 2000
This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956424
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A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction
Perry, Motty; Wolfstetter, Elmar; Zamir, Shmuel - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 1998
This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956456
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Auctions and corruption
Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 2000
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956471
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Third- and higher-price auctions
Wolfstetter, Elmar - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 1995
This paper solves the equilibrium bid functions of third- and higher-price auctions for a large class of distribution … auctions, equilibrium bids exceed bidders' valuations, and bidders raise their bids when one moves to a higher price auction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956519
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Scale economies and the dynamics of recurring auctions
Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Wolfstetter, Elmar - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 1998
the converse is not generally true. Moreover, first- and second-price auctions are not always revenue equivalent. Indeed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956588